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Abstract
There has been a long debate on equilibrium characterization in the negotiation
model when players have diﬀerent time preferences. We show that players behave
quite diﬀerently under diﬀerent time preferences than under common time preferences.
Conventional analysis in this literature relies on the key assumption that all continua-
tion payoﬀs are bounded from above by the bargaining frontier. However, when players
have diﬀerent time preferences, intertemporal trade may lead to continuation payoﬀs
above the bargaining frontier. We provide a thorough study of this problem without
imposing the conventional assumption. Our results tie up all the previous findings,
and also clarify the controversies that arose in the past.
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1 Introduction
Endogenous threats are an essential constituent of bargaining problems, as emphasized in
Nash (1953) at the dawn of modern bargaining theory. The bargaining literature in the 1990s
successfully incorporates endogenous threats into the alternating-oﬀer bargaining model of
Rubinstein (1982). The early contributions in this area, such as Fernandez and Glazer
(1991), Haller (1991) and Haller and Holden (1990), study the selection of industrial action
by a union during its contract negotiation with a firm. In contrast to Rubinstein (1982),
after a proposal is rejected, the union needs to decide what course of industrial action to take
before the next bargaining round.1 Later contributions, such as Busch andWen (1995, 2001),
Houba (1997), and Slantchev (2003), allow for more general forms of endogenous threats,
modeled as a normal-form game, called the disagreement game, to be played between oﬀers
and counter oﬀers.2 Except Fernandez and Glazer (1991), Muthoo (1999) and Slantchev
(2003), all the above mentioned work treats the case of common times preferences.
Despite our well-understanding on the negotiation model with common time preferences,
there has been a controversy on the equilibrium characterization in this model when time
preferences diﬀer. This class of models generally admits multiple equilibria and the set of
the equilibria is fully characterized by so-called extremal equilibria that yield the lowest or
highest equilibrium payoﬀs to a player. Bolt (1995) demonstrates that the strategy profile
supporting the firm’s worst equilibrium provided by Fernandez and Glazer (1991) fails to
be an equilibrium when the firm is less patient than the union. He then provides a no-
concession strategy to the firm and shows that it can be sustained in equilibrium. Recently,
one of the claims by Slantchev (2003) suggests that the firm’s no-concession strategy always
supports the firm’s worst equilibrium when the firm is less patient than the union. This
implication, however, contradicts another finding reported in Bolt (1993) that an always-
1Fernandez and Glazer (1991), Haller (1991) and Haller and Holden (1990) consider two industrial actions.
Houba and Bolt (2000) consider the strategic substitutability among several forms of industrial actions by
the union.
2This negotiation model is surveyed in Muthoo (1999) and Houba and Bolt (2002).
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strike strategy sometimes yields a even lower payoﬀ to the firm. Instead of invoking the
technique of Shaked and Sutton (1984) to derive extremal equilibria in this model, Bolt
(1995) and Slantchev (2003) simply verify whether a given strategy profile constitutes an
equilibrium. Muthoo (1999) notices the necessity to apply the technique of Shaked and
Sutton (1984) in his study on the negotiation model with diﬀerent time preferences, but
seems unaware of this controversy.
We treat this controversy seriously, not only to settle the open issue of the extremal
equilibria, but more importantly, to reexamine the methodology used in previous studies.
For more than twenty years, the backward induction technique of Shaked and Sutton (1984)
has been proven to be a very powerful and eﬀective tool in studying bargaining problems.
Application of this technique relies on all possible continuation payoﬀs being bounded by the
bargaining frontier as specified in the bargaining problem, which holds in most bargaining
problems. However, if some continuation payoﬀs lie above the bargaining frontier, there
will be no mutually acceptable agreement available. In deriving the bounds of equilibrium
payoﬀs, it is often treated as a fact that players always reach some agreement (in every
subgame), such as in the original study of Shaked and Sutton (1984). For the model of
Rubinstein (1982), it is without any loss of generality to assume that only acceptable oﬀers
count, as is demonstrated by Fudenberg and Tirole (1991), who incorporate the possibility
of making unacceptable oﬀers into this technique when discussing this model.
For the negotiation model, all continuation payoﬀs are bounded by the bargaining frontier
under common time preferences. However, this is definitely not the case when the players
have diﬀerent time preferences. As been realized in other dynamic problems, Pareto improve-
ment is possible through intertemporal trade among agents with diﬀerent time preferences,
see e.g., Ramsey (1928), Bewley (1972) and, more recently, Lehrer and Pauzner (1999).
In the context of repeated games, Lehrer and Pauzner (1999) demonstrate that there are
many individually-rational feasible payoﬀs outside the conventional (convex) set of ‘feasible
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payoﬀs’.3 What matters is that, under diﬀerent discount factors, an infinite sequence of
two payoﬀ vectors does not lead to a trivial convex combination of these vectors. Unlike
repeated games, feasible outcome paths in bargaining models are less flexible, because sta-
tionary agreements, by default, cease any future payoﬀ variation. This is not a serious issue
in the alternating-oﬀer model of Rubinstein (1982), because all possible outcome paths are
dominated by some immediate agreement. However, in the negotiation model it is possible
for both players to benefit from playing some endogenous disagreement outcomes for some
periods prior to an agreement that rewards the more patient player. Those benefits can be
so dramatic that the resulting continuation payoﬀ vector is above the bargaining frontier.
This fact is exactly what has been overlooked in the negotiation model and the root of the
controversy in the current literature.
Our analysis of the negotiation model avoids making any assumption on continuation
payoﬀs. In order to provide a clear-cut demonstration of the issues and its resolution, we
consider common interest disagreement games where there is a Pareto dominant disagree-
ment outcome.4 This class of negotiation models includes the models in Fernandez and
Glazer (1991) and Slantchev (2003) as special cases, which are at the center of this contro-
versy. In doing so, we are able to clarify why there is a problem in the less patient player’s
worst equilibrium. After identifying the source of the controversy, we demonstrate how the
backward induction technique of Shaked and Sutton (1984) works with the possibility of
unacceptable oﬀers. These considerations significantly aﬀect the nature of the backward
induction argument, in the sense that we may have to trace how players behave in extremal
equilibria for more than two periods. We show that, except in the less patient players’
worst equilibrium, every player will make acceptable oﬀers along the course of equilibrium
play. This partly validates those results obtained under the presumption that all possible
continuation payoﬀs are bounded by the bargaining frontier.
3Lehrer and Pauzner (1999) show not all individually rational payoﬀs can be supported in equilibrium,
because every subsequence also has to be individually rational.
4Common interest games have been studied in other dynamic settings, see, e.g., Farrel and Saloner (1985)
and Takahashi (2005).
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Complications arise in deriving the less patient player’s worst equilibrium. In this case,
continuation payoﬀs in many subgames can be above the bargaining frontier so that there are
no mutually acceptable agreements available. In the less patient player’s worst equilibrium,
we show that if delay happens, it will involve only an even number of periods prior to
agreement. In this way, the less patient player is unable to exploit his advantage to propose
at the time of the equilibrium agreement. Due to the complicated nature of the problem,
we no long can have a closed-form solution to the less patient player’s lowest equilibrium
payoﬀ. Instead, we first show that the less patient player’s equilibrium payoﬀs are bounded
from below by the least fixed point of a well-defined minimax problem. We then provide an
equilibrium strategy profile, which is novel to the literature, to support such a least fixed
point. In other words, this equilibrium is indeed the worst equilibrium to the less patient
player. Our results also shed light on why those complications do not arise in Rubinstein
(1982) even when players have diﬀerent time preferences.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the negotiation model,
summarize some undisputed results, and illustrate why continuation payoﬀs can be above
the bargaining frontier if and only if the two players have diﬀerent time preferences. We
then provide an example in Section 3 to demonstrate some of the unsettled issues in this
model. The analysis is partitioned into two sections. In Section 4 we derive a set of nec-
essary conditions to characterize extremal equilibria in this model without relying on the
conventional assumption discussed. We also show that, except in the less patient player’s
worst equilibrium, players behave similarly as in the case of common time preferences. In
Section 5, we resolve the complications involved with the worst equilibrium payoﬀ for the
less patient player: First we show that equilibrium payoﬀs to this player are bounded from
below by the least fixed point of a well-defined minimax problem. Then we provide an equi-
librium strategy profile supporting the least fixed point, which demonstrates that it is the
worst equilibrium to the less patient player. Section 6 oﬀers some concluding remarks.
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2 The Model and Pareto Eﬃciency
Consider the negotiation model in which two players, named 1 and 2, negotiate how to split an
infinite stream of surpluses of certain value, all normalized to be 1 per period. In any period
before reaching an agreement, one player makes a proposal on how to split this normalized
value in all future periods and the other player either accepts or rejects the proposal. If
the proposal is accepted, then it will be implemented immediately, which ceases any future
strategic interaction between the players. If the proposal is rejected, then both players will
have to play a disagreement game before the negotiations proceed to the following period.
More specifically, the model consists of infinitely many periods where player 1 proposes in
all odd periods and player 2 proposes in all even periods. A proposal is a stationary contract
and is denoted as
x = (x1, x2) ∈ ∆ =
©
(x1, x2) ∈ R2+ : x1 + x2 = 1
ª
from which player i’s payoﬀ is xi in every period after both players agree on x ∈ ∆ (the
unit simplex). We call ∆ the bargaining frontier. The disagreement game is given in normal
form:
G = {A1, A2, d1 (·) , d2 (·)} ,
where Ai is the set of player i’s disagreement actions that is assumed to be non-empty and
compact, and di (·) : A → R is player i’s disagreement payoﬀ function that is assumed to
be continuous, where A = A1 × A2 is the set of disagreement outcomes. We also assume
d1 (a) + d2 (a) ≤ 1 meaning every disagreement outcome is weakly dominated by some
agreement. To ease exposition, we denote player i’s highest disagreement payoﬀ when he
deviates from a ∈ A unilaterally by
gi (a) = max
a0i∈Ai
di(a0i, aj).
Without loss of generality, every player’s minimax value in G is normalized to be zero, i.e.,
min
aj∈Aj
max
ai∈Ai
di(a) = min
a∈A
gi(a) = 0.
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We consider common interest disagreement games with a unique dominant outcome. This
model includes the class of negotiation models studied in Fernandez and Glazer (1991), Haller
and Holden (1990), Bolt (1995), and Slantchev (2003). Formally, there is an a∗ ∈ A such
that d(a∗) ≥ d(a) for all a ∈ A. Obviously, a∗ ∈ A is a Nash equilibrium in G. Without loss
of generality, we assume that d (a∗) is on the bargaining frontier ∆, i.e. d1 (a∗)+d2 (a∗) = 1.
This last assumption does not qualitatively change our analysis, as we will argue in the
concluding remarks.
A generic outcome path, denoted by π =
¡
a1, a2, · · · , aT , x¢ for T ≥ 0, consists of all
disagreement outcomes (at ∈ A in period t for t ≤ T ) before the agreement x ∈ ∆ is reached
in period T + 1.5 By convention, T = ∞ is an outcome path with perpetual disagreement.
From such an outcome path π, player i’s intertemporal time preferences are represented by
the sum of his discounted payoﬀs from the disagreement game before the agreement and the
agreement itself afterward:
(1− δi)
TX
t=1
δt−1i di
¡
at
¢
+ δTi xi, (1)
where δi ∈ (0, 1) represents player i’s discount factor per period.
The negotiation model described so-far is a well-defined noncooperative game of complete
information. A history is a complete description of how the game has been played up to a
period. A player’s strategy specifies one appropriate action for every finite history. Every
strategy profile induces a unique outcome path and players evaluate their strategies based on
their discounted payoﬀs from the induced outcome path. The equilibrium concept applied
throughout this paper is subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE).
Next, we summarize some undisputed results for this model from previous studies in the
form of a proposition for later reference. We state these results without proof and in terms
of player i ∈ {1, 2}, while refer to his opponent as player j 6= i.6
5When T = 0, the outcome path specifies immediate agreement.
6Although di(a∗) = 1 − dj(a∗), one should not interchange them since most results we state in their
current forms hold even if di(a∗) + dj(a∗) < 1.
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Proposition 1 In the negotiation model, we have:
(i) for all (δi, δj) ∈ (0, 1)2, there is a stationary SPE where player i receives di(a∗) in every
period;
(ii) for suﬃciently large (δi, δj) ∈ (0, 1)2 and δi ≥ δj, there is a SPE where player i receives
1− δj
1− δiδj
[1− dj(a∗)] when player i proposes and
δi(1− δj)
1− δiδj
[1− dj(a∗)] when player j proposes;
(iii) for suﬃciently large (δi, δj) ∈ (0, 1)2 and δi < δj, there is a SPE where player i receives
1
1 + δi
di(a∗) when player i proposes and
δi
1 + δi
di(a
∗) when player j proposes.
Slantchev (2003) claims that the non-stationary SPE of this proposition are the extremal
SPE where player i receives his lowest SPE payoﬀ.
Proposition 1 asserts that the model always has multiple equilibria when the players are
suﬃciently patient. In particular, there is a positive gap between a player’s highest and lowest
SPE payoﬀ. As discussed in the introduction, what is less clear is a full characterization of
the set of SPE payoﬀs when the discount factors are suﬃciently large.
The Pareto frontier has not yet received enough attention in this type of model. In
the alternating oﬀer model of Rubinstein (1982), this issue is trivial, because the Pareto
frontier coincides with the bargaining frontier. In the negotiation model, however, this is
no longer the case. In the context of repeated games, Lehrer and Pauzner (1999) show that
a sequence of two payoﬀ vectors may not lead to a trivial convex combination of the two
payoﬀ vectors when the players have diﬀerent time preferences. Pareto improvement can
be realized if the less patient player trades his long-run payoﬀs for short-run payoﬀs.7 In
7The results in e.g. Ramsey (1928) and Bewley (1972) indicate that similar insights already have a long
history in economics.
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fact, they demonstrate that when two players have diﬀerent time preferences, many subgame
perfect equilibrium payoﬀs in a repeated game are not in the set of feasible and individually
rational payoﬀs, as traditionally defined. In the negotiation model, such Pareto improvement
is also present, but it cannot be realized within stationary contracts. Consider an outcome
path consisting of a ∈ A for T − 1 periods followed agreement on (xi, 1− xi) in period T .
The sum of their payoﬀs is equal to
di (a) + dj (a) + δ
T
i (xi − di (a)) + δTj (1− dj (a)− xi) , (2)
which can be greater than 1, such as for xi < di (a) and δj suﬃciently large.8 Applying the
ideas of Lehrer and Pauzner (1999) in the negotiation model, we must first maximize (2) in
order to obtain the Pareto frontier. This requires that a = a∗, so that (2) becomes
1 +
¡
δTj − δTi
¢
(di (a
∗)− xi) , (3)
and xi = 0 whenever δi < δj, or xi = 1 whenever δi > δj. Next, we convexify the payoﬀ
vectors for two consecutive values of T : play a∗ for T ≥ 0 periods with probability 1−p ∈ [0, 1]
and for T +1 periods with probability p. As a result, we obtain a piecewise linear curve with
infinitely many segments. It becomes a concave and smooth curve as both δi and δj go to 1,
see Lehrer and Pauzner (1999) for details. Note that the nonlinear curve only represents the
part of the Pareto frontier that lies above the bargaining frontier, while the remaining part
coincides with the bargaining frontier, as illustrated in Figure 1. The set of feasible payoﬀs is
not convex and the entire Pareto frontier cannot be described by a concave function, which
is quite diﬀerent from the standard assumptions in the bargaining literature. If and only if
δi = δj, the Pareto frontier is the same as the bargaining frontier.
As Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) show for the alternating oﬀer model, it is without loss
of generality to assume that all continuation payoﬀs are bounded by the bargaining frontier
when applying the method of Shaked and Sutton (1984) to derive the bounds on equilibrium
payoﬀs. This is not the case in the negotiation model since continuation payoﬀs can lie
8(2) is also greater than 1 for 1− xi < dj (a) and δi suﬃciently large.
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Figure 1: The Pareto frontier for δi > δj and δi < δj.
above the bargaining frontier when players have diﬀerent time preferences, which is why the
conventional analysis breaks down. Furthermore, as we will make clear later, neither xi = 0
or xi = 1 corresponds to a SPE agreement. This hints at that Pareto eﬃcient outcome
paths may not be achievable in equilibrium. Instead, in equilibrium we need to consider
continuations with xi corresponding to extremal equilibrium agreements.
3 An Example
In this section, we present an example to demonstrate some of the unsolved issues and prob-
lems in the negotiation model when players have diﬀerent time preferences. Consider the
model described in Section 2 with the following 2× 2 disagreement game for ε ≥ 0:
Player 1 \ Player 2 L R
U 0.5, 0.5 −ε, 0.5
D 0.5, 0 0, −1
where a∗ = (U,L). For simplicity, we consider pure actions only.
To support the non-stationary SPE stated in Proposition 1 for i = 1, two players would
play (U,L) in any odd period and (D,R) in any even period. When δ1 ≥ δ2, both players
behave as if in the alternating oﬀer model with disagreement point (0, 0.5), from which
player 1 receives 1−δ2
1−δ1δ2 ·0.5 in any odd period. By the one-stage deviation principle, see e.g.,
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Fudenberg and Tirole (1991), player 1 prefers to make such an oﬀer if and only if
1− δ2
1− δ1δ2
· 0.5 ≥ (1− δ1) · 0.5 + δ1 · 1− δ2
1− δ1δ2
· 0.5 ⇔ δ1 ≥ δ2. (4)
For δ1 < δ2, the non-stationary SPE of Proposition 1 requires that only player 2 makes the
least acceptable oﬀer. Consequently, player 1 receives 1
1+δ1 · 0.5 in any odd period, which
is equal to player 1’s present value from the infinite sequence of alternating disagreement
outcomes.
The open issue we concern in this paper is the worst SPE to the less patient player.
Incorporating the possibility of unacceptable oﬀers, we will show that the non-stationary
SPE of Proposition 1 is indeed player 1’s worst SPE when δ1 ≥ δ2 (Proposition 7). When
δ1 < δ2, contrary to common belief, player 1’s worst SPE has not been established yet in
the literature. First, player 1’s worst SPE when δ1 ≥ δ2 is no longer an equilibrium when
δ1 < δ2, because of (4). Next, we demonstrate that the non-stationary SPE of Proposition
1 when δ1 < δ2 is not player 1’s worst SPE in general.
Consider the following strategy profile:
• In an odd period, player 1 demands
x∗ =
1− δ2
1− δ1δ2
·
1
2
+
δ2
δ1
1− δ1
1− δ2
ε
¸
(5)
and player 2 will reject if and only if player 1 demands more than x∗.
If player 1 demands more than x∗ and player 2 rejects, then (U,R) will be played.
Since player 1 may want to deviate from U , continuation must depend on whether
player 1 deviates or not.
• In an even period, if (U,R) is played in the last period, player 2 will oﬀer δ1x∗+ 1−δ1δ1 ε
and player 1 will accept any oﬀer no less than δ1x∗ + 1−δ1δ1 ε . Otherwise, player 2 will
oﬀer δ1x∗ and player 1 will accept any oﬀer no less than δ1x∗.
If player 1 rejects an oﬀer that should be accepted, then (D,R) will be played.
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• If player 2 deviates from the strategies described above, such as oﬀers less than what
should be oﬀered, or rejects what should be accepted, or deviates in the disagreement
game, then the continuation involves an immediate switch to the stationary SPE of
Proposition 1.
It is easy to verify that this strategy profile constitutes a SPE when δ2 is suﬃciently
large. First, player 2 is indiﬀerent between accepting and rejecting player 1’s demand x∗:
1− x∗ = (1− δ2) · 0.5 + δ2
·
1−
µ
δ1x∗ +
1− δ1
δ1
ε
¶¸
,
which yields x∗ as given by (5). Rewarding player 1 with additional 1−δ1δ1 ε is just enough to
induce player 1 to play U . Unlike in the non-stationary SPE of Proposition 1, player 1 is
better oﬀ to demand x∗ than to make an acceptable proposal since
x∗ > δ1
µ
δ1x
∗ +
1− δ1
δ1
ε
¶
⇔ x∗ > ε
1 + δ1
,
which is true when ε is not too large. Player 2’s incentive to comply is enforced by the
stationary equilibrium as punishment if player 2 ever deviates, which is credible when δ2 is
suﬃciently large.
Figure 2 shows that for δ1 = 0.8 and ε = 0.15, x∗ is lower than 0.51+δ1 for all δ2 ∈ (0.925, 1),
which contradicts Slantchev’s (2003) claim about player 1’s extremal SPE. This observation
is quite robust, in the sense that it holds for a wide range of values for ε and δ1. If ε = 0,
x∗ = 0.5 · 1−δ2
1−δ1δ2 < 0.5 · 11+δ1 for all δ2 > δ1. As we will show in Section 5.4, the SPE we have
just studied is not player 1’s worst SPE when δ1 < δ2. Player 1’s worst SPE is somewhat
more complicated, so we postpone discussion. The neglected issue in supporting a player’s
worst SPE is that the players may not reach an immediate agreement. As it will become clear
later, delay in reaching an agreement can happen to support the less patient player’s worst
SPE. When it happens, it dominates reaching agreement immediately. As we have argued,
the players may trade-oﬀ their diﬀerences in time preferences with a delayed agreement and
this may Pareto dominate reaching an agreement immediately.
11
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Figure 2: Plot of x∗ with respect to δ2 ∈ (δ1, 1) for δ1 = 0.8 and ε = 0.15.
4 Extreme Bounds of SPE Payoﬀs
The key to characterize the set of SPE payoﬀs is to derive each player’s lowest and highest
SPE payoﬀ. With the possibility of unacceptable oﬀers, we first provide a set of necessary
conditions for the extreme bounds of SPE payoﬀs by generalizing the backward induction
technique of Shaked and Sutton (1984). We then solve these extreme bounds and support
them by SPEs for suﬃciently large discount factors.
Let Ei be the set of SPE payoﬀs in any period in which player i proposes and player j
responds for j 6= i. For simplicity, we suppress all the other parameters that Ei may depend
on, such as the discount factors. Given the existence of SPE (Proposition 1) and the model
setup, the set Ei is a non-empty and bounded subset of [0, 1]2. For l = i, j we define
mil = infv∈Ei
vl and M il = sup
v∈Ei
vl, (6)
the infimum and the supremum of player l’s SPE payoﬀs in any period where player i
proposes. Proposition 1 implies that mil ≤ dl(a∗) ≤ M il for all (δi, δj) ∈ (0, 1)2, with strict
inequalities for suﬃciently large (δi, δj) ∈ (0, 1)2.
In any period in which player i proposes, if player j rejects player i’s oﬀer then both
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players will have to play a disagreement outcome a ∈ A, followed by a continuation SPE
with payoﬀ vector v = (vi, vj) ∈ Ej in the following period in which player j proposes. The
continuation payoﬀ vector v generally depends on the disagreement outcome a ∈ A so that
if a player deviates from a then the continuation payoﬀ vector will change accordingly. By
definition, we have mjl ≤ vl ≤M
j
l for l = i, j. Given the continuation payoﬀ vector v ∈ Ej,
playing a ∈ A in G is sequential rational for player l if and only if
(1− δl)dl(a) + δlvl ≥ (1− δl)gl(a) + δlmjl . (7)
Inequality (7) states that player l’s payoﬀ from complying is at least what he could obtain
by deviating from a ∈ A. Obviously, any Nash equilibrium of G, including a∗ ∈ A, satisfies
the credibility constraint (7) for all discount factors and all continuation payoﬀ vectors.
As we have argued, the controversy in the current literature is due to the negligent of
unacceptable oﬀers when applying the backward induction technique of Shaked and Sutton
(1984). By incorporating the possibility of unacceptable oﬀers explicitly, we first obtain the
following proposition:
Proposition 2 For all (δi, δj) ∈ (0, 1)2 and l = i and j,
mil ≥ infa∈A,v∈Ej U
i
l (a, v) , s.t. (7), (8)
M il ≤ sup
a∈A,v∈Ej
U il (a, v) , s.t. (7), (9)
where
U ii (a, v) = max
½
(1− δi)di(a) + δivi,
1− (1− δj)dj(a)− δjvj,
(10)
U ij (a, v) = (1− δj)dj(a) + δjvj. (11)
Proof. Given the necessary structure of any SPE in a period in which player i proposes,
if player i makes an unacceptable oﬀer, such as oﬀering player j less than (1−δj)dj(a)+δjvj,
then player i will receive (1− δi)di(a) + δivi. On the other hand, in order to induce player
j to accept, player i will have to oﬀer at least (1 − δj)dj(a) + δjvj to player j, from which
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player i will receive at most 1− (1− δj)dj(a)− δjvj. By sequential rationality, player i will
choose either an unacceptable oﬀer or the least acceptable oﬀer to player j, whichever yields
player i a higher payoﬀ. Therefore, player i’s payoﬀ when proposing is equal to U ii (a, v) as
given by (10). Whether player i makes an unacceptable oﬀer or the least acceptable oﬀer,
player j will always receive U ij (a, v), as given by (11).
For l = i and j, player l’s SPE payoﬀs in any period in which player i proposes must be
between the infimum and supremum of U il (a, v) for all a ∈ A and v ∈ Ej under the credibility
constraint (7).
Although the objective functions in (8) and (9) are continuous and A is compact by
assumption, we know nothing about Ej at this stage. Therefore, the extremum of (8) and
(9) may not be achievable. In other words, infimum and supremum cannot be replaced by
minimum and maximum in these optimization problems at this stage of the analysis.
From Proposition 2, we are able to solve mij, M
i
j and M
i
i in terms of m
i
i and m
j
j, which
we will do in the remainder of this section. In Section 5, we will derive mii, which requires
us to understand the set Ej when both players have diﬀerent time preferences.
Given Proposition 2, the following conditions on the extreme bounds of player j’s SPE
payoﬀs (as the responding player), mij and M
i
j , are immediate:
Proposition 3 For all (δi, δj) ∈ (0, 1)2, we have
mij ≥ δjm
j
j, (12)
M ij ≤ (1− δj)dj(a∗) + δjM
j
j . (13)
Proof. Substituting (11) into (8), we have
mij ≥ infa∈A,v∈Ej [(1− δj) dj(a) + δjvj] s.t. (7)
≥ min
a∈A
£
(1− δj)gj(a) + δjmjj
¤
due to (7)
= (1− δj)min
a∈A
gj(a) + δjm
j
j
= δjm
j
j,
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which is (12). Notice that player j’s minimax value mina∈A gj(a) = 0 by assumption. Sub-
stituting (11) into to (9), we have
M ij ≤ sup
a∈A,v∈Ej
[(1− δj)dj(a) + δjvj] s.t. (7)
≤ (1− δj)max
a∈A
dj(a) + δj sup
v∈Ej
vj due to (7)
= (1− δj)dj(a∗) + δjM jj , due to (6),
which is (13).
For suﬃciently large (δi, δj) ∈ (0, 1)2, Proposition 3 implicitly specifies how the players
behave in the responder’s worst and best SPE. In player j’s worst SPE, if player j rejects
any oﬀer, he will receive his minimax value of 0 in the current period followed by his lowest
SPE payoﬀ mjj in the following period. In player j’s best SPE, on the other hand, if player j
rejects any oﬀer, he will receive his highest disagreement payoﬀ dj(a∗) in the current period
followed by his highest SPE payoﬀ M jj in the following period. In fact, when the players
are suﬃciently patient, (12) and (13) hold with equalities for the responding player’s lowest
and highest SPE payoﬀs. These results are similar to those of Busch and Wen (1995), where
both players have the same discount factor.
We now turn to M ii , the supremum of the proposing player’s SPE payoﬀs.
Proposition 4 For suﬃciently large (δi, δj) ∈ (0, 1)2,
M ii ≤ 1−mij. (14)
Proof. Substituting (10) into (9), we have
M ii ≤ sup
a∈A,v∈Ej
max
½
(1− δi)di(a) + δivi,
1− (1− δj)dj(a)− δjvj,
s.t. (7)
= max
½
supa,v [(1− δi)di(a) + δivi] , s.t. (7),
supa,v [1− (1− δj)dj(a)− δjvj] , s.t. (7),
≤ max
½
(1− δi)di(a∗) + δiM ji , due to di(a) ≤ di(a∗) and (6),
1−mij, due to (8) and (11).
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For suﬃciently large (δi, δj) ∈ (0, 1)2, however, it cannot be the case that 1 − mij ≤ (1 −
δi)di(a∗)+ δiM
j
i . Suppose not, thenM
i
i ≤ (1− δi)di(a∗)+δiM
j
i and (13) implyM
i
i ≤ di(a∗),
which contradictsM ii > di(a
∗) as we established for suﬃciently large discount factors. Hence,
(14) must hold.
In obtaining player i’s highest SPE payoﬀwhen this player proposes, Proposition 4 implies
player i oﬀers mij to player j and player j will accept. For suﬃciently large discount factors,
(12), (13) and (14) yield that
mij ≥ δjm
j
j,
M ij ≤ (1− δj)dj(a∗) + δj
¡
1− δimii
¢
,
M ii ≤ 1− δjm
j
j.
Therefore, mii and m
j
j are the key to determine the other extremal bounds of players’ equi-
librium payoﬀs.
5 The Infimum of the Proposer’s SPE Payoﬀs
From Proposition 2 and mji ≥ δimii, we rewrite the condition for mii as
mii ≥ infa∈A,v∈Ejmax
½
(1− δi)di(a) + δivi,
1− (1− δj)dj(a)− δjvj,
(15)
s.t. vi ≥
1− δi
δi
[gi(a)− di(a)] + δimii. (16)
In solving the minimax problem (15), we proceed in two steps: First, it is necessary to
establish some properties of the set Ej, in particular, the Pareto frontier of Ej that contains
all eﬀective continuation payoﬀs to solve (15). Next, we use these properties to characterize
the infimum for each of the two cases identified in Section 2, namely δi ≥ δj and δi < δj.
Obviously, any SPE where player i receives mii would be player i’s worst SPE. It turns out
that the non-stationary SPE of Proposition 1 is in fact player i’s worst SPE when δi ≥ δj.
For δi < δj, we provide an equilibrium strategy profile to support mii. In order to illustrate
the characterization and the novel insights we obtained, especially for the second case, we
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reconsider the example of Section 3. We conclude this section with a technical discussion on
robustness.
5.1 Eﬀective Continuation Payoﬀs
In order to fully understand the issues involved, we have to discuss what continuation payoﬀs
are most eﬀective in solving (15). For every a ∈ A, credibility constraint (16) requires that
player i receives at least 1−δiδi [gi(a)− di(a)] more than δim
i
i in the following period. For
(vi, vj) ∈ Ej and (vi, v0j) ∈ Ej, if vj ≥ v0j then
max
½
(1− δi)di(a) + δivi,
1− (1− δj)dj(a)− δjvj,
≤ max
½
(1− δi)di(a) + δivi,
1− (1− δj)dj(a)− δjv0j.
Therefore, at any solution of (15), player j must receive his highest continuation payoﬀ while
player i’s continuation payoﬀ satisfies the credibility constraint (16). Given the setup of our
model, define
K = max
a∈A
[gi(a)− di(d)] <∞.
For suﬃciently large (δi, δj) such that m
j
i ≤ δi1+δidi(a
∗) from Proposition 1, we have that¡
1− δ2i
¢
K < δidi(a∗) is a suﬃcient condition for
1− δi
δi
[gi(a)− di(a)] +mji ≤
1− δi
δi
K +
δi
1 + δi
di(a∗) < di(a∗).
This means that for suﬃciently large discount factors, we only have to consider those con-
tinuation payoﬀs where player i receives strictly less than di(a∗).
As argued in Section 2, the literature on the negotiation model has taken for granted
that all continuation payoﬀs lie on or below the bargaining frontier. Since this is not the
case here, we must explicitly take into account the possibility of continuation payoﬀs that
lie above the bargaining frontier. For δi > δj, those payoﬀs all lie on the irrelevant side of
d (a∗), i.e., [di (a∗) , 1] while mii < di (a
∗). Therefore, it is without of loss of generality in this
case to assume the bargaining frontier is the Pareto frontier in solving (15).
In the remainder of this subsection, we deal with the more complicated case: δi < δj. In
Section 2, we show that the Pareto frontier corresponds to xi = 0. However, xi = 0 cannot
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be supported in equilibrium, as Lemma 5 shows. This implies that Pareto frontier cannot
be part of any SPE, including player i’s worst SPE. The following lemma provides a lower
bound for mii, which may not be attainable in equilibrium either. The proofs of the lemmas
in this subsection are deferred to the appendix.
Lemma 5 For all (δi, δj) ∈ (0, 1)2, we have
mii ≥
1− δj
1− δiδj
[1− dj(a∗)] > 0.
The most eﬀective way in supporting player i’s worst SPE corresponds to the smallest
x˜i in any SPE. This requires that x˜i = m
j
i for even T and x˜i = m
i
i for odd T . What is clear
from Section 2 is that in order to solve (15), it is suﬃcient to consider continuation paths
where the players play a∗ for T ≥ 0 periods followed by player i’s worst SPE in period T +1.
Accordingly, we define
vi(T ) = (1− δTi )di(a∗) + δTi x˜i, (17)
vj(T ) = (1− δTj )dj(a∗) + δTj (1− x˜i), (18)
where we suppress x˜i in our notation. Note that the eﬀective continuation payoﬀ vector
(vi(T ), vj(T )) ∈ Ej is above the bargaining frontier:
vi(T ) + vj(T ) = 1 + (δ
T
j − δTi )[di(a∗)− m˜i] > 1 ⇔ δi < δj. (19)
It is clear that such continuations may occur in supporting player i’s worst SPE, which is
what has been overlooked in previous studies.
We now turn our attention to the set of eﬀective continuation payoﬀs, i.e., the Pareto
frontier of Ej. This frontier is fully characterized by {(vi(T ), vj(T ))}T∈2N, where 2N denotes
the set of all even number, implied by the following lemma:
Lemma 6 For any even T ≥ 0 and all δi < δj,
vi(T ) < vi(T + 1) ≤ vi(T + 2) < di(a∗) (20)
vj(T ) > vj(T + 2) < vj(T + 1) < dj(a∗) (21)
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Lemma 6 is best illustrated by Figure 3, where (vi(T ), vj(T )) is represented by solid
dots for even T ≤ 8 and open dots for odd T < 8. It implies that for any even T ≥ 0,
(vi(T + 1), vj(T + 1)) is dominated by a segment of convex combinations of (vi(T ), vj(T ))
and (vi(T + 2), vj(T + 2)). Intuitively, if the continuation path were associated with an odd
T , then player i would propose an oﬀer along such a continuation, from which player i could
exploit his first-mover advantage. Consequently, such a continuation cannot be eﬀective in
solving (15).
Any convex combination of (vi(T ), vj(T )) and (vi(T+2), vj(T+2)) can be achieved by the
following path: First play a∗ for T periods, then for p ∈ [0, 1], agree onmii in period T+1 with
probability 1− p, and with probability p, continue to play a∗ for two more periods followed
by agreement mii . Such a continuation path yields (1−p)vl(T )+pvl(T +2) to player l = i, j.
Similar as for the Pareto frontier, eﬀective continuation payoﬀs consist of the piecewise linear
part above the bargaining frontier. We incorporate these eﬀective continuation payoﬀs into
a single function. Formally, given mii, we define the function ϕ(· , δimii) : [0, 1]→ [0, 1], as
ϕ(vi, δimii) ≡ max
½
1− vi, min
T∈2N
½
vj(T ) +
vj(T + 2)− vj(T )
vi(T + 2)− vi(T )
[vi − vi(T )]
¾¾
. (22)
The graph of ϕ(·, δimii) describes all possibly eﬀective continuation payoﬀ vectors. In contrast
to the current literature, this function corrects the problem of assuming only the first part
of (22) as the set of eﬀective continuation payoﬀs.
The function ϕ(vi , δimii) is continuous and monotonically decreasing in vi and m
i
i (also
through the v’s). Given mii, ϕ(vi, δim
i
i) > 1− vi for all vi ∈ (δimii, di(a∗)), and ϕ(vi, δimii) =
1− vi otherwise. In particular, ϕ(δimii, δimii) = 1− δimii, just as Figure 3 illustrates. Note
that (16) and (vi, vj) ∈ Ej imply that
vj≤ϕ(vi, δimii) ≤ ϕ
µ
1− δi
δi
[gi(a)− di(a)] +mji , δimii
¶
.
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Figure 3: Eﬀective continuation payoﬀs for T ≤ 8.
5.2 Player i is at least as patient as player j
As we have argued, all eﬀective continuation payoﬀs in solving (15) must be on the bargaining
frontier when δi ≥ δj. That is, two players always reach an agreement in the following period
where player j proposes. Then, (16) becomes
vj ≤ 1− vi ≤ 1− δimii −
1− δi
δi
[gi(a)− di(a)].
Substituting the last inequality into (15) yields
mii ≥ mina max
(
(1− δi)gi(a) + δimji ,
(1− δj)
h
1− dj(a) + δj(1−δi)δi(1−δj) [gi(a)− di(a)]
i
+ δjm
j
i ,
≥ min
a
½
(1− δj)
·
1− dj(a) +
δj(1− δi)
δi(1− δj)
[gi(a)− di(a)]
¸
+ δiδjm
i
i
¾
≥ (1− δj)
·
min
a
[1− dj(a)] +
δj(1− δi)
δi(1− δj)
min
a
[gi(a)− di(a)]
¸
+ δiδjmii
= (1− δj) [1− dj(a∗)] + δiδjmii.
Solving for mii, we obtain (again) the lower bound of Lemma 5.
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Proposition 7 For suﬃciently large (δi, δj) ∈ (0, 1)2 and δi ≥ δj, we have
mii ≥
1− δj
1− δiδj
[1− dj(a∗)] . (23)
The non-stationary SPE of Proposition 1 yields player i exactly 1−δj
1−δiδj [1− dj(a
∗)]. In
other words, this non-stationary SPE is indeed player i’s worst SPE. It follows from Propo-
sition 7 and 8 that it is also player j’s best SPE. To summarize, for suﬃciently large (δi, δj)
and δi ≥ δj, we have
mii =
1−δj
1−δiδj [1− dj(a
∗)] , M ij = dj(a
∗) +
δj(1−δi)
1−δiδj [1− dj(a
∗)] ,
mji =
δi(1−δj)
1−δiδj [1− dj(a
∗)] , M jj = dj(a
∗) + 1−δi
1−δiδj [1− dj(a
∗)] .
When δi ≥ δj, player i’s worst SPE resembles the unique SPE in the alternating-oﬀer model
in which player i receives 0 and player j receives dj(a∗) in every disagreement period, which is
identical to the situation when δi = δj. These findings validate previous results concerning
the more patient player’s worst SPE by taking explicitly into account the possibility of
unacceptable oﬀer.
5.3 Player i is less patient than player j
The complications that arise in solving (15) when δi < δj are incorporated in the function
ϕ. Since (16) and (vi, vj) ∈ Ej imply that
vj≤ϕ(vi, δimii) ≤ ϕ
µ
1− δi
δi
[gi(a)− di(a)] +mji , δimii
¶
andmji ≥ δimii, problem (15) can be rewritten as the fixed point problemmii ≥ Λ(mii), where
Λ(mii) ≡ mina∈A max
(
(1− δi)gi(a) + δ2imii,
1− (1− δj)dj(a)− δjϕ
³
1−δi
δi [gi(a)− di(a)] + δim
i
i, δim
i
i
´
.
(24)
This is a well-defined minimax problem where the two functions under the maximum in (24)
are continuous and increasing in mii. Our main result of this subsection is the following
proposition that provides a lower bound of mii for all δi < δj.
Proposition 8 For all δi < δj, function Λ(·) has at least one fixed point in the relevant
interval for mii, i.e.,
h
1−δj
1−δiδj [1− dj (a
∗)] , 1
1+δidi (a
∗)
i
, and mii is bounded from below by the
least fixed point of Λ(·).
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Proof. Recall that Λ(·) is well-defined, continuous and monotonically increasing. For all
mii ∈
h
1−δj
1−δiδj [1− dj (a
∗)] , 1
1+δidi (a
∗)
i
and vi ∈ [δimii, di (a∗)], we have
dj (a∗) ≤ ϕ
¡
vi, δimii
¢
≤ 1− δimii. (25)
Evaluating Λ(·) at the upper end of this relevant interval, we obtain
Λ
µ
1
1 + δi
di (a∗)
¶
≤ max
(
(1− δi)di(a∗) + δ2i 11+δidi (a
∗)
1− (1− δj)dj(a∗)− δjϕ
³
δi 11+δidi (a
∗) , δi 11+δidi (a
∗)
´
= max
(
1
1+δidi (a
∗)
1− (1− δj)dj(a∗)− δj
³
1− δi 11+δidi (a
∗)
´
= max
(
1
1+δidi (a
∗)
1−(δj−δi)
1+δi di (a
∗)
=
1
1 + δi
di (a∗) ,
where the first inequality holds because at a = a∗ we have vi = δimii = δi
1
1+δidi (a
∗), and the
second inequality is due to (25). Next, evaluating Λ(·) at the lower end of relevant interval,
we have
Λ
µ
1− δj
1− δiδj
[1− dj (a∗)]
¶
= min
a∈A
max



(1− δi)gi(a) + δ2i
1−δj
1−δiδj di (a
∗)
1− (1− δj)dj(a)− δjϕ
³
1−δi
δi [gi (a)− di (a)] + δim
i
i, δim
i
i
´¯¯¯
mii=
1−δj
1−δiδj
[1−dj(a∗)]
≥ min
a∈A
max
(
(1− δi)gi(a) + δ2i
1−δj
1−δiδj di (a
∗)
1− (1− δj)dj(a)− δjϕ
³
δi
1−δj
1−δiδj [1− dj (a
∗)] , δi
1−δj
1−δiδj [1− dj (a
∗)]
´
= min
a∈A
max
(
(1− δi)gi(a) + δ2i
1−δj
1−δiδj di (a
∗)
1− (1− δj)dj(a)− δj
h
1− δi 1−δj1−δiδj [1− dj (a
∗)]
i
≥ min
a∈A
½
(1− δj) [1− dj(a)] + δiδj
1− δj
1− δiδj
[1− dj (a∗)]
¾
= (1− δj)
·
1−max
a∈A
dj(a)
¸
+ δiδj
1− δj
1− δiδj
[1− dj (a∗)]
= (1− δj) [1− dj (a∗)] + δiδj
1− δj
1− δiδj
[1− dj (a∗)]
=
1− δj
1− δiδj
[1− dj (a∗)] .
Once again, the first inequality is due to (25), and the other (in)equalities are trivial. Because
of its monotonicity, function Λ(·) maps from
h
1−δj
1−δiδj [1− dj (a
∗)] , 1
1+δidi (a
∗)
i
into itself. By
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Brouwer’s fixed point theorem, Λ(·) has at least one fixed point in the relevant interval.
Since Λ(·) is monotonically increasing, any value ofmii that is strictly less than the least fixed
point of Λ(·) certainly violates inequality (24). This concludes the proof of the proposition.
Our next proposition asserts that when the discount factors are suﬃciently large, the
least fixed point Λ(·) can be supported as player i’s SPE payoﬀ. Therefore, mii is indeed the
least fixed point of Λ(·) whenever it can be supported as player i’s SPE payoﬀ. Since the
proof is rather long, we defer it to the appendix.
Proposition 9 For all δi ∈ (0, 1), there exists δˆj ∈ (δi, 1) such that for all δj ∈
³
δˆj, 1
´
,
there is a SPE in which player i receives the least fixed point of Λ(·).
Propositions 8 and 9 imply that when the discount factors are large enough, the least fix
point of Λ(·) is indeed an SPE payoﬀ and, of course, it is player i’s lowest SPE payoﬀ. All
the other extreme bounds derived in Section 4 can also be supported as SPE payoﬀs. To
support mji = δim
i
i as player i’s SPE when player j proposes, consider the following strategy
profile: Player j oﬀers mji = δim
i
i to player i and player i accepts any oﬀer higher than
mji = δim
i
i. If player i rejects m
j
i = δim
i
i, then player i will be minimaxed followed by his
worst SPE from which player i receives mii. Any of player j’s deviation will be followed by
the stationary SPE of Proposition 1, which is suﬃcient to enforce player j to comply. In
this equilibrium, player j receives his highest SPE payoﬀM jj = 1− δimii as the proposer and
player i receives his lowest SPE payoﬀ mji = δim
i
i as the responder. The strategy profile that
supports the responder’s highest equilibrium payoﬀ will simply call for a∗ in the first period,
followed by his best SPE (as the proposer) in the following period. Consequently, we have
completely characterized the set of equilibrium payoﬀs in this model when discount factors
are suﬃciently large.
23
5.4 The Example Revisited
We now derive player 1’s worst SPE when δ1 < δ2 in the example studied in Section 3.
Proposition 9 implies that delay will happen (with certain probability) after player 1’s (non-
equilibrium) demand is rejected. Consider the following strategy profile:
• In an odd period, player 1 demands
x∗∗ =
1− δ2
1− δ1δ2
·
1
2
+
δ2
δ1
1 + δ2
1 + δ1
ε
¸
(26)
and player 2 will reject if and only if player 1 demands more than x∗∗.
If player 1 demands more than x∗∗ and player 2 rejects, then (U,R) will be played.
• In an even period, if player 1 deviates from U in the last (odd) period, player 2 will
oﬀer δ1x∗∗ and player 1 will accept.
• Otherwise, with probability 1− p, player 2 will oﬀer δ1x∗∗ in the current even period,
and with probability p, (U,L) will be played for two periods, followed by player 2’s
oﬀer δ1x∗∗. Player 1 accepts in both cases. In this equilibrium,
p =
1
δ1(1− δ1)
· ε
0.5− δ1x∗∗
. (27)
• In an even period, if player 1 rejects δ1x∗∗ (that should be accepted), then (D,R) will
be played once followed by player 1’s demand x∗∗.
• If player 2 deviates from the strategies described above, then continuation will switch
immediately to the stationary SPE of Proposition 1.
To verify that the above strategy profile constitutes a SPE, first note that player 1 has
no incentive to deviate from (U,R) if his payoﬀ from deviation is the same as what player 1
receives if he does not:
δ21x
∗∗ = (1− δ1) · (−ε) + δ1
£
(1− p)δ1x∗∗ + p
¡
0.5(1− δ21) + δ31x∗∗
¢¤
. (28)
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Figure 4: Plots of x∗∗ with respect to δ2 ∈ (δ1, 1) for δ1 = 0.8 and ε = 0.15.
One can show that (28) holds for p as given by (27). Next, player 1 should demand x∗∗
rather than making an unacceptable proposal,
x∗∗ ≥ (1− δ1) · (−ε) + δ1
£
(1− p)δ1x∗∗ + p
¡
0.5(1− δ21) + δ31x∗∗
¢¤
= δ21x
∗∗,
which follows from (28). Lastly, player 1 cannot demand more than x∗∗ since 1 − x∗∗ is
exactly equal to player 2’s continuation payoﬀ after rejecting any demand higher than x∗∗:
1− x∗∗ = 0.5(1− δ2) + δ2[(1− p)(1− δ1x∗∗) + p
£
0.5(1− δ22) + δ22(1− δ1x∗∗)
¤
]. (29)
In fact, (28) and (29) yield x∗∗ and p as given by (26) and (27), respectively.
For the same set of parameters, i.e., δ1 = 0.8 and ε = 0.15, Figure 4 shows x∗∗ is less
than x∗ for all δ2 > δ1. For δ2 ∈ (0.877, 1), we have x∗∗ ≤ 0.51+δ1 . When the diﬀerence between
the players’ time preferences is not significant enough such as δ2 ∈ (0.8, 0.877), it would not
be optimal to have delay in the continuation while compensating player 1. In such a case,
the non-stationary SPE of Proposition 1 is player 1’s worst SPE. However, such incidence
diminishes as the value of ε decreases.
5.5 Discussion
In this section we further discuss our new results and relate them to the literature.
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First, in the proof of Proposition 9, player j’s behavior is enforced by the stationary SPE
of Proposition 1 rather than player j’s worst SPE. When δi < δj, player j’s worst SPE is
characterized by Proposition 7, where
mjj =
1− δi
1− δiδj
dj(a∗) < dj(a∗).
If player j is punished by his worst SPE, the condition on δj yields a lower threshold for
δj than the one used in the proof. Adopting the stationary equilibrium simplifies the proof
since player j has a constant continuation payoﬀ dj(a∗) whenever player j deviates.
Second, it is generally impossible to obtain a closed-form solution formii from (24). How-
ever, if there is no need to compensate player i, the continuation payoﬀ after player i’s (non-
equilibrium) oﬀers are rejected will be on the bargaining frontier, i.e., at (δimii, ϕ(δim
i
i)) =
(δimii, 1− δimii) associated with T = 0. In such cases, we have
Proposition 10 Suppose aˆ ∈ A solves (24) at the least fixed point of Λ(·) and gi(aˆ) = di(aˆ).
Then
mii = max
½
1
1 + δi
di(aˆ),
1− δj
1− δiδj
[1− dj(aˆ)]
¾
. (30)
Proof. In (24), since gi(aˆ) = di(aˆ), we have
mii = max
½
(1− δi)di(aˆ) + δ2imii
1− (1− δj)dj(aˆ)− δjϕ (δimii,mii)
= max
½
(1− δi)di(aˆ) + δ2imii
1− (1− δj)dj(aˆ)− δj [1− δimii]
= max
½
(1− δi)di(aˆ) + δ2imii
(1− δj) [1− dj(aˆ)]− δiδjmii,
which yields (30).
Third, all SPE with immediate agreement xi ∈ (mii, di (a∗)) fail Pareto eﬃciency, when
δi < δj. This fact is quite diﬀerent from the results thus far obtained in the bargaining
literature.
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6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we pin down what has been overlooked in previous studies on the negotiation
model when players have diﬀerent time preferences. Players may trade the diﬀerence in time
preferences from which both of them could be better oﬀ than from reaching an immediate
agreement. Such a trade is possible only if they disagree for some periods. Therefore,
simply disagree does not necessarily imply ineﬃciency when the players have diﬀerent time
preferences. This matters in a player’s worst equilibrium outcome as we need to count for
the least irresistible oﬀer to the other player. In our study, we formally incorporate this
line of argument in the equilibrium analysis. One should not put too much emphasis on
what numerical value we get, but what is rather important is how players behave in those
extreme situations. It is also important not to overlook the possibility of unacceptable oﬀers
in bargaining models.
The results in this paper are quite robust. First, since (2) is applicable to any dis-
agreement game, it is generally the case that some continuation payoﬀs may lie above the
bargaining frontier when the players have diﬀerent time preferences. Second, all our results
as stated, namely Proposition 6 to 10, will not be eﬀected if d (a∗) lies below the bargaining
frontier. The reason is that the ϕ(·) function we define in (22) is independent of the assump-
tion of d (a∗) being on the bargaining frontier. However, if d (a∗) is below the bargaining
frontier, it will enlarge the set of discount factors for which delay does not occur in sup-
porting the less patient players’ worst SPE, and a closed-form solution becomes available.
At the extreme case d (a∗) = 0, the negotiation model is equivalent to the alternating-oﬀer
model in Rubinstein (1982), and only then all continuation payoﬀs will be bounded by the
bargaining frontier for all discount factors.
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7 Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 5
Note that for all a ∈ A and v ∈ Ej, dj(a) ≤ dj(a∗) and M jj ≤ 1− δimii imply that
1− (1− δj)dj(a)− δjvj ≥ 1− (1− δj)dj(a∗)− δjM jj
≥ 1− (1− δj)dj(a∗)− δj(1− δimii)
= (1− δj) [1− dj(a∗)] + δjδimii.
Together with (15), we have mii ≥ (1 − δj) [1− dj(a∗)] + δjδimii, which leads to the stated
result. ¥
Proof of Lemma 6
Recall the following inequalities:
1− δj
1− δiδj
[1− dj(a∗)] ≤ mii ≤
1
1 + δi
di(a∗) < di(a∗).
For any even T ≥ 0, we have
vi(T ) = (1− δTi )di(a∗) + δT+1i mii
< (1− δT+1i )di(a∗) + δT+1i mii = vi(T + 1),
vi(T + 1) = (1− δT+1i )di(a∗) + δT+1i mii
≤ (1− δT+2i )di(a∗) + δT+3i mii = vi(T + 2),
where the first inequality is trivial, and the second inequality is due to mii ≤ 11+δidi(a
∗).
Comparing player j’s payoﬀs, we have
vj(T ) = (1− δTj )dj(a∗) + δTj (1− δimii)
> (1− δT+2j )dj(a∗) + δT+2j (1− δimii) = vj(T + 2),
vj(T + 2) = (1− δT+2j )dj(a∗) + δT+2j (1− δimii)
≥ (1− δT+1j )dj(a∗) + δT+1j (1−mii) = vi(T + 1),
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where the first inequality is trivial, and second inequality is due to 1−δj
1−δiδj [1− dj(a
∗)] ≤ mii.
¥
Proof of Proposition 9
The proof of this proposition is constructive. Given δi ∈ (0, 1), ∃ δˆj ∈ (δi, 1) large enough
so that for all a ∈ A and δj ∈
³
δˆj, 1
´
,
(1− δj)dj(a) + δj
µ
1− di(a
∗)
1 + δi
¶
> dj(a∗). (31)
Given δi ∈ (0, 1) and δj ∈
³
δˆj, 1
´
, denote mˆ as the least fix point of Λ(·). Accordingly, there
exist aˆ ∈ A, Tˆ ∈ 2N, and pˆ ∈ [0, 1] such that (15) holds with equality at mˆ:
mˆ = max



(1− δi)di(aˆ) + δi
h
(1− pˆ)vi(Tˆ ) + pˆvi(Tˆ + 2)
i
,
1− (1− δj)dj(aˆ)− δj
h
(1− pˆ)vj(Tˆ ) + pˆvj(Tˆ + 2)
i
,
s.t. (1− pˆ)vi(Tˆ ) + pˆvi(Tˆ + 2) ≥
1− δi
δi
[gi(a)− di(a)] + δimˆ.
We have the following two cases to examine:
Case 1: mˆ = (1− δi)di(aˆ) + δi
h
(1− pˆ)vi(Tˆ ) + pˆvi(Tˆ + 2)
i
.
Consider the following strategy profile: Player i makes an unacceptable oﬀer (such as de-
mands mˆ or more). Player j rejects if and only if player i oﬀers less than
(1− δj)dj(aˆ) + δj[(1− pˆ)vj(Tˆ ) + pˆvj(Tˆ + 2)] ≥ 1− mˆ,
followed by aˆ once. If player i deviates from aˆ, player j will oﬀer δimˆ and player i will accept
in the following period. Otherwise, they play a∗ until player j will oﬀer δimˆ either in period
Tˆ with probability 1− pˆ or in period Tˆ + 2 with probability pˆ, while player i will accept. If
player i rejects δimˆ that should be accepted, player i will be minimaxed once, followed by
what is described above, from which player i receives δimˆ (player i’s worst SPE when player
j proposes). During this course, no one will make any acceptable oﬀer. If player j deviates
from what is described above, player j will be punished by the stationary equilibrium of
Proposition 1, from which player j receives dj(a∗).
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We now verify sequential rationality. It is clear from the construction that no one deviates
in the proposing and responding stages. For example, player i has to oﬀer at least
(1− δj)dj(aˆ) + δj
h
(1− pˆ)vj(Tˆ ) + pˆvj(Tˆ + 2)
i
in order to induce player j to accept, from which player i receives less than mˆ. In any period
where a∗ should be played, there is no mutually acceptable proposal because the continuation
payoﬀ vector lies strictly above the bargaining frontier. Player i has no incentive to deviate
from either a∗ or aˆ, due to the construction of the continuation payoﬀs. On the other hand,
if player j deviates from aˆ, he will receive no more than (1 − δj)gj(aˆ) + δjdj(a∗) ≤ dj(a∗).
If player j deviates elsewhere, he cannot receive more than dj(a∗) either. Inequality (31)
implies that if player j ever deviates, his payoﬀ will be less than his lowest continuation
payoﬀ. Hence, player j will not deviate.
Case 2: mˆ = 1− (1− δj)dj(aˆ)− δj
h
(1− pˆ)vj(Tˆ ) + pˆvj(Tˆ + 2)
i
.
Consider the following strategy profile: Player i demands mˆ. Player j rejects if and only
if player i demands more than mˆ. If player i demands more and player j rejects (which
should not occur), two players will play a∗ until player j oﬀers δimˆ in either period Tˆ with
probability 1− pˆ or in period Tˆ + 2 with probability pˆ, which will be accepted by player i.
Similar to Case 1, no one will deviate after player i demands more mˆ and player j
rejects. If player i demands more than mˆ at the beginning, player j will reject, and player i
will receive
(1− δi)di(aˆ) + δi
h
(1− pˆ)vi(Tˆ ) + pˆvi(Tˆ + 2)
i
≤ mˆ.
Therefore, player i will demand mˆ, which will be accepted by player j. In summary, no one
has incentive to deviate when player i is supposed to demand mˆ.
We have shown that in either case, there is an equilibrium where player i receives mˆ, the
least fixed point of Λ(·), when proposing an oﬀer. ¥
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